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In past publications, I have referred to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as Hong Kong's "gold standard"
because of its special place in the constitutional order.1 The treaty has been
incorporated into the domestic legal system through the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights Ordinance (Cap 383) (BORO)2 and art 39 of the Basic Law, Hong
Kong's constitutional instrument. Although the Basic Law contains other
provisions protecting human rights, art 39 is arguably the most important
provision because it links Hong Kong to international norms. Local judges
have regularly referred to international and foreign jurisprudence when
applying the ICCPR to specific disputes and have declined to enforce local
legislation that could not be interpreted so as to comply with the ICCPR.4
Equally important, the Hong Kong government has acknowledged that it
must abide by the ICCPR, even in the context of acts taken in the name
of national security and public order.5 This commitment to enforce the
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ICCPR within the region has helped Hong Kong to maintain a reasonably
high degree of civil liberties since 1997, although China itself has never
ratified the treaty and has become increasingly totalitarian under the rule
of Xi Jinping.6
Yet in the past three years, considerable damage has been done to
Hong Kong's reputation as the freest city in China.7 Some of the worst
examples (such as the disappearance of Le Po from Hong Kong in
December 2015) are likely attributable to Beijing's clandestine actions
in the territory.8 However, the decision by Hong Kong's Secretary for
Security to prohibit the operation of the Hong Kong National Party9
(HKNP) is an action by the Hong Kong government, which could
eventually be reviewed by the judiciary.10 Until July 2018, the HKNP was
a fairly obscure party - with only two known members and no elected
legislators.11 However, the government's decision to prohibit this
tiny group has made the HKNP famous, not only locally2 but also
internationally.13 If challenged in court, the Secretary's order will present
a new test of the region's commitment to the ICCPR because it represents
a content-based restriction on the fundamental freedoms of expression
and association. The situation is thus qualitatively different from
HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu, in which the Court of Final Appeal upheld local
laws prohibiting flag desecration, largely because the laws restricted only
the form of expression rather than the content.14
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After a brief review of the factual background, this article analyses the
Secretary for Security's stated reasons and considers whether the ban on
the HKNP can be reconciled with the ICCPR and the Basic Law.
2. The Background to the Prohibition of the HKNP
Disillusioned by the lack of democratic reform and increased interference
from Beijing, a small number of Hong Kong residents have embraced the
political ideology known as "localism". In March 2016, Andy Chan Ho
Tin took this ideology a step further and formed the HKNP, with the
stated goal of advocating for an independent Hong Kong. Chan, a recent
university graduate, believes that secession is the only way that Hong Kong
citizens can stop the erosion of their way of life. He sought to spread that
message through a variety of speech acts, including messages on Facebook,
speeches and radio interviews. Although he concedes that he used
"provocative political rhetoric" in the early stages of his advocacy, Chan
insists that the HKNP made, as early as July 2016, an express commitment
to nonviolence.15 In an affirmation submitted when he attempted to stand
for election to the Legislative Council, Chan further stated that the HKNP
accepted that Hong Kong is a part of China and did not propose a unilateral
declaration of independence; rather, the party advocated for "political
engagement with the PRC authorities to discuss changes to Hong Kong's
future constitutional arrangement", which Chan believed could occur in
2047, 50 years after China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong.
16
HKNP's stated goal is widely viewed as a mere pipedream and Chan
has few resources at his disposal. Nonetheless, the very existence of this
small party provoked a strong reaction - not only from Beijing itself but
also from certain local politicians who were eager to show their loyalty to
the Central Government. 17 As Chan was not committing any obvious
I Written Submissions dated 14 September 2018 from Chan Ho Tin to the Secretary for Security
Re: Recommendation on Prohibiting the Operation of the Hong Kong National Party under s 8
of the Societies Ordinance, paras 69-73 (submitted under cover of letter dated 14 September
2018 from Daly, Ho & Associates to the Secretary for Security) (Written Submissions).
16 Ibid., para 87 (quoting from Chan's second affirmation for his election petition). Chan's
reference to 2047 stems from art 5 of the Basic Law which states that "the previous capitalist
system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years". Similar language appears in art
3 (12) of the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong (1984).
17 An official from the Central Government was quoted as suggesting that Chan should be
prosecuted for "seditious speech" under s 9 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200) and some local
politicians also supported this idea; however, a criminal prosecution would have been very
difficult because the Crimes Ordinance must be interpreted so as to comply with the BORO and
the ICCPR. See Alvin Lum, "Separatist Leader Andy Chan Cannot Be Charged under Current
Hong Kong Law, City Lawyers Say" South China Morning Post (17 August 2018).
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criminal offences, the government has instead relied upon its considerable
administrative powers to quash its advocacy. For example, Chan's efforts
to register the HKNP were blocked18 and his nomination to stand for
election to the Legislative Council was invalidated by a Returning
Officer.19 However, the decision by the Secretary for Security to prohibit
the very operation of the HKNP is a far more dramatic step. By declaring
it an "unlawful society", the government has exposed anyone who joins
or gives aid to the party to the possibility of criminal prosecution.1 The
order took effect immediately and the government wasted no time using
it to discourage pro-independence advocacy. For example, the Education
Bureau wrote to local universities and to more than 500 secondary schools,
reminding them that students should not promote independence or offer
assistance to "illegal societies" if they wished to avoid criminal liability.
The Organised Crime and Triad Bureau is now monitoring protest marches
for any sign of public support for the HKNP.23 The government also appears
to have used its considerable discretion over immigration matters to punish
the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents' Club (FCC) for hosting a talk by
Chan, even before the HKNP was banned.4
There is no doubt that the order prohibiting the HKNP constitutes
a restriction on the fundamental freedoms of association and expression,
which includes the right to "seek, receive and impart information
and ideas" of all kinds.5 The order also restricts the right to political
I Political parties in Hong Kong can only be registered as companies or societies. Chan attempted
to incorporate the HKNP as a company but has been prevented from doing so. Written
Submissions (n 15 above) para 81.
19 Returning Officers are civil servants appointed to vet the formal qualifications of candidates.
The High Court subsequently dismissed Chan's election petition against the Returning Officer's
decision. Chan Ho Tin v Lo Ying Ki Alan [2018] 2 HKLRD 7. Chan abandoned his appeal
because he was not granted legal aid. Alvin Lum, "Hong Kong National Party's Andy Chan
Drops Appeal against Election Ban after Failing to Get Legal Aid for Court Fight" South China
Morning Post (13 September 2018).
2 The Secretary acted under s 8(2) of the Societies Ordinance.
21 Ibid., ss 19-23 (defining numerous criminal offenses, including acting as a member, attending a
meeting or giving aid to an unlawful society).
22 Tony Cheung and Su Xinqi, "Students Who Associate with Outlawed Hong Kong National
Party Can Face Criminal Sanctions, Government Tells Schools as Top Beijing Official
Welcomes Ban" South China Morning Post (26 September 2018).
23 Alvin Lum and Clifford Lo, "Hong Kong Protesters Channel Catalan Spirit as They March for
Independence While Testing Limits of Ban That Saw Separatist Party in the City Outlawed"
South China Morning Post (1 October 2018).
2' The work visa of the Vice-President of the FCC (who served as host for the speech and declined
to cancel the event, despite pressure from local and government officials) was not renewed;
the local government has refused to comment on the matter. See Jeffie Lam, Tony Cheung and
Su Xinqi, "Backlash as Hong Kong Denies Visa Renewal for Financial Times Journalist Victor
Mallet" South China Morning Post (5 October 2018).
21 ICCPR arts 19 and 22; see also Basic Law art 27. While the Basic Law does not expressly allow
for limitations, the judiciary has looked to the ICCPR when assessing the extent to which the
local government may lawfully limit the exercise of these rights.
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participation and may constitute discrimination on the ground of political
opinion." The question is whether the government would be able to justify
these restrictions if the order is challenged in court. The ICCPR and the
BORO expressly allow restrictions on the freedoms of association and
expression if they are "provided by law" and "necessary in a democratic
society" for certain legitimate purposes, including national security, public
order and the rights and freedoms of others.7 The provision cited by the
Secretary for Security sets a very similar standard, providing that the process
for banning a society may only be initiated when the Societies Officer
"reasonably believes that the prohibition of the operation or continued
operation of a society or a branch is necessary in the interests of national
security or public safety, public order or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others".8 Moreover, like all local ordinances, the Societies
Ordinance must be interpreted so as to comply with the ICCPR.
The remainder of this article thus assesses the Secretary for Security's
reasoning and certain procedural concerns, in light of judgments by the
Court of Final Appeal and decisions by the United Nations Human
Rights Committee (the treaty-monitoring body for the ICCPR). Judgments
by the European Court of Human Rights are also considered because
Hong Kong courts frequently rely upon them as persuasive authority.
3. Procedural Deficiencies Alleged by Chan
If the order banning the HKNP is challenged in court, one of the first
considerations will be whether the Secretary for Security afforded the
HKNP an opportunity to be heard and respond to the allegations against
it. Pursuant to art 14 of the ICCPR (which was copied, verbatim into
the BORO), everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing in
any determination of a person's legal rights and obligations." Given that
the ban on the HKNP exposes members to the possibility of criminal
prosecution, any process relating to its prohibition should have been
treated as quasi-criminal and included a particularly high level of
procedural justice.
Chan has alleged that his ability to refute the allegations made by
the Assistant Societies Officer was hindered by numerous procedural
26 ICCPR arts 2, 25 and 26.
27 ICCPR arts 19, 21 and 22; BORO s 8 arts 16 and 18.
2 Societies Ordinance s 8 (1)(a).
'9 BORO s 8 art 10; ICCPR art 14. The UN Human Rights Committee has emphasised that
this obligation applies to civil actions as well as criminal prosecutions. See UN Human Rights
Committee, General Comment 13: art 14 (Administration of Justice), adopted in the 21st
Session (1984), para 2.
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deficiencies, including that: (1) he was not provided with publicly
funded legal assistance; (2) he was not provided with all of the materials
that he requested from the government; (3) his request to make oral
submissions before the Secretary reached a decision was denied; (4)
he was given insufficient time to prepare his written submissions to
the Secretary; and (5) nine members of the Executive Council made
comments in the public domain regarding the HKNP and therefore
should have recused themselves from the discussion and decision-
making of his appeal. 30
The extent to which these factors have prejudiced Chan is unclear at
this time. It is, however, very possible that he was adversely affected by
the tight timetable set by the Secretary for Security. Although the police
were apparently monitoring the HKNP for two years (and constructed
an enormous dossier), Chan did not receive the Assistant Societies
Officer's recommendation that the party should be banned until July
2018. Chan was initially given only three weeks to make written
representations as to why the Secretary for Security should not accept
the recommendation and ban the party. The deadline was extended
to approximately eight weeks; subsequent requests for extensions
were denied. This is surprising, especially given the enormous volume
of material that Chan needed to review (more than 1,000 pages of
documents plus numerous audio and video recordings made by the police
during their surveillance of the HKNP). It is not difficult to imagine how
this rigid schedule, combined with the government's refusal to provide
publicly funded legal assistance, could have prejudiced Chan's ability to
refute the allegations made by the Assistant Societies Officer.31 This is
particularly important because, as demonstrated in the next section, the
Secretary for Security's reasons for the order draw heavily upon certain
factual inferences, which Chan disputes.
4. Assessing the Legitimacy of Restrictions on ICCPR-Protected
Rights
The Court of Final Appeal has established that a restriction on rights
protected by the ICCPR and Basic Law is only lawful if the restriction
is no more than necessary to accomplish legitimate aims and if a "fair
31 Written Submissions (n 15 above) paras 4-27 and letter dated 24 October 2018 from Daly &
Associates to the Office of the Chief Executive. As of 7 December 2018, no decision on the
appeal had been announced.
31 Chan has stated that he has limited financial means and has only been able to obtain "limited
assistance provided on a pro bono basis". Written Submissions (n 15 above) para 23.
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balance" has been struck between the demands of the community and the
requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights.32
The "cogency of the justification required" increases with the extent of
the interference and the importance of the right.33 Thus, the wider the
restriction the more difficult it would be to justify.34
As this is the first time that the Hong Kong government has attempted
to ban a political party, a court reviewing the order would almost certainly
look to international jurisprudence for guidance. The UN Human Rights
Committee has observed that an order banning the operation of a political
party constitutes a severe restriction on fundamental rights because
"the existence and functioning of a plurality of associations, including
those which peacefully promote ideas not favourably received by the
government or the majority of the population, is one of the foundations
of a democratic society." " Thus, an order banning a political party would
require a particularly high showing of necessity by the government. The
European Court of Human Rights has also held that only "convincing and
compelling reasons" can justify restrictions on political parties' freedom of
association.3" This is particularly true when a government forces a political
party to dissolve, which the HKNP must do to avoid criminal liability. Such
a "drastic measure" requires very serious reasons before it can be considered
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and will be warranted only in
the most serious of cases.37
The Secretary for Security is clearly aware of the high standard
and has attempted to rely upon virtually all of the grounds allowed by
the ICCPR: national security; public safety and public order; and the
rights and freedoms of others.38 Although there is some overlap in the
Secretary's reasoning, it is important to analyse each ground separately
because the Secretary claims that the order can be justified on the
basis of each of these grounds, whether considered "independently or
"39collectively".
32 This is part of the four-part analysis expressly adopted by the Court of Final Appeal in Hysan
Development Co Ltd v Town Planning Board (2016) 19 HKCFAR 372, [70]-[77].
33 Ibid., [108]-[112].
31 Ibid.
31 Jeong-Eun Lee v Republic of Korea, Communication No 1119/2002, UN Doc CCPR/
C/84/D/1119/2002 (2005), [7.2]-[7.3].
36 Umo Ilinden-Pirin v Bulgaria, ECHR (First Section), Application no 59489/00 (20 October
2005), [561.
31 Ibid.
3' Enclosure 2 (n 10 above) para 2. See also "Transcript of Remarks by Secretary for Security on
Exercising Powers under Societies Ordinance" (24 September 2018), available at https://www.
info.gov.hk/gia/general/201809/24/P2018092400678.htm.
39 Enclosure 2 (n 10 above) para 4.
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(a) Is the Order "Necessary" to Protect National Security?
In the area of national security, courts generally give the government a
certain "margin of discretion" because the executive branch may be in
a better position to assess potential threats.4" But that does not mean
that the court will accept a bald assertion that a political party
threatens national security.4 1 Rather, the government has the burden of
demonstrating that the order is truly "necessary to avert a real, and not only
hypothetical danger to the national security or democratic order and that
less intrusive measures would be insufficient to achieve this purpose."42
The government must demonstrate in "specific and individualised fashion"
the precise nature of the threat posed by the HKNP and the "necessity and
proportionality of the specific action taken".43
The Human Rights Committee has consistently applied these
requirements when governments have attempted to use "national security"
as a justification for restricting the rights of association and expression.
For example, in Jeong-Eun Lee v Republic of Korea, the Committee rejected
South Korea's assertion that it was necessary to criminalise membership
in Hanchongnyeon (a party representing university students) because
the government failed to demonstrate, in specific terms, how the party
presented "a real danger to the national security and democratic order"
of South Korea.44 Similarly, in Tae-Hoon Park v Republic of Korea, the
Committee determined that South Korea violated the ICCPR when
it prosecuted a student for his involvement in an organisation that
advocated for the peaceful reunification of North and South Korea. The
South Korean government could not demonstrate how the party's advocacy
threatened national security. These two decisions are striking because the
Committee acknowledged that South Korea is in a precarious security
situation. Nonetheless, simply designating certain organisations as "enemy
benefiting" was not sufficient to demonstrate a threat to national security.
Rather, the burden was on the government o "specify the precise nature
of the threat" posed by the student groups.45 The Committee has applied
a similar approach when reviewing complaints arising from restrictions on
advocacy for a labour strike or other peaceful assembly.46
"o Hysan Development Co Ltd (n 32 above), [116]-[117].
4 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34 art 19. Freedoms of opinion and
expression, 12 September 2011, CCPR/C/GC/34, para 35. General Comments by the treaty-
monitoring body are considered highly authoritative interpretations of treaty obligations.
42 Jeong-Eun Lee (n 35 above), [7.2].
43 General Comment 34 (n 41 above), para 35.
44 Jeong-Eun Lee (n 35 above), [7.2].
4' Tae-Hoon Park v Republic of Korea, Communication No 628/1995, 3 November 1998, [10.3].
41 Sohn v Republic of Korea, Communication No 518/1992, 14 July 1995, especially [10.4].
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The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (which have been cited by the Hong Kong courts as persuasive
authority) set similar standards for governments seeking to rely upon
national security as a ground for restricting fundamental rights.47
National security can only be used to justify restrictive measures when
they are demonstrably necessary to respond to a genuine threat to the
existence of the nation, its territorial integrity or political independence.
Similarly, under the Johannesburg Principles, governments bear the
burden of proving that the genuine purpose and demonstrable effect
of the restriction is to "protect a country's existence or its territorial
integrity against the use or threat of force, or its capacity to respond to
the use of force.
48
In the case of the HKNP, the Secretary for Security has argued that the
HKNP threatens national security simply because it has taken "concrete
steps" to achieve independence. The term "concrete steps" was probably
intended to convey a picture of actions that pose a genuine threat to
China's national security or territorial integrity. In fact, the "steps" cited
by the Secretary consist of a long list of speech acts and other peaceful
activities, such as printing leaflets, giving radio interviews, raising funds
and attempting to register the HKNP as company (which the government
blocked). It is hard to imagine how any of these activities - especially
when taken by a miniscule party that was already prohibited from fielding
candidates for the Legislative Council - constitute a genuine threat to
China's territorial integrity or its capacity to respond to the use of force.
Indeed, Chan had previously stated (in an affirmation) that the tiny party
was not hoping to seize power or to declare independence unilaterally.
Rather, the HKNP hoped to build public support for its cause and then
eventually pursue "political engagement with the PRC authorities" to
discuss changes that might occur in 2047. 41 It is inconceivable that this
mild plan could threaten the national security of one of the world's great
military powers.
Indeed, there are a host of political parties in other parts of the world,
which actively advocate for regional self-determination, either in the
UN Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 28 September 1984, UN Doc
E/CN 4/1985/4, at Pt VI, National Security.
Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information,
published as an Annex to UN Doc E/CN 4/1996/39 (1996), Principles 1(d) and 2(a).
49 Written Submissions (n 15 above), para 87 (quoting from Chan's second affirmation in support
of his election petition, which was rejected).
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form of autonomy or full independence. Examples include the Hawaiian
Independence Party, the Parti Quebecois in Canada, the Scottish
National Party and the New Flemish Alliance in Belgium.5" Governments
that adhere to the ICCPR generally understand that they cannot prohibit
these parties solely on the basis of their separatist beliefs.
When certain European governments have tried to outlaw separatist
parties, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently
rejected the argument that advocacy for independence is an inherent
threat to national security.51 For example, in a case brought against
Bulgaria, the Court did not accept the government's assertion that it
needed to ban the activities of a Macedonian organisation in order
to protect Bulgaria's security and territorial integrity. The Court
held that:
[tlhe mere fact that a group of persons calls for autonomy or even requests
secession of a part of a country's territory - thus demanding fundamental
constitutional and territorial changes - cannot automatically justify
interference with their rights ... expressing separatist views and demanding
territorial changes in speeches, demonstrations, or program documents does
not amount, per se, to a threat to a country's territorial integrity and national
security.52
The European Court of Human Rights has also considered a number
of cases in which the government alleged that the separatist party was
inciting violence and these decisions illustrate the level of evidence
that would be required. For example, in Siirek v Turkey (No 3), the
Court accepted Turkey's argument that it was necessary to prosecute
the applicant because he expressed support for the use of armed force
by the PKK, a known terrorist organisation that was already engaged in
an armed conflict with the Turkish government.53 In contrast, in Incal v
Turkey, the Court found that Turkey violated the European Convention
when it prosecuted the applicant for circulating a pamphlet that simply
accused the government of harassing Kurdish traders and urged citizens to
oppose the harassment hrough neighbourhood committees.54 Similarly,
" For a more comprehensive list of such parties in Europe, see Christian On Sun, Political
Autonomist and Secessionist Parties in the EU (Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates
to the European Union, 2017), available at http://www.aalep.eu/political-autonomist-and-
secessionist-parties-eu (visited 1 November 2018).
" See, eg, Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria, ECHR (First Section),
Applications nos 29221/95 and 29225/95 (2001), [97].
2 United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria, ECHR (Application no 59491/00 (19 January
2006), [761.
" ECHR (Grand Chamber), Application no 24735/94 (1999).
" ECHR (9 June 1998), in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV, p 1569.
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when Turkey prosecuted a trade union president for writing an article
that condemned acts of "state terrorism" against the Kurdish people, the
Court found that the criminal conviction was disproportionate because
there was no evidence that the article encouraged violence against
the state.55
Thus, if the Hong Kong government hopes to justify the prohibition
of the HKNP on national security grounds then it should be prepared to
show that the HKNP was either a violent separatist movement itself or
was, at a minimum, likely to incite violence against state authorities. In the
press conference announcing his decision to ban the party, the Secretary
for Security strongly implied that the HKNP fell within this category,
stating that "I cannot ignore the fact that the [HKNP] has repeatedly
advocated that it would use all methods, including the use of force, and
also encouraging its supporters to use force."56 If a court were to accept this
factual inference then it might be able to uphold the order banning the
HKNP on the narrow ground that it had, at least at one time, advocated
violence. Interestingly, however, in the Secretary for Security's formal
statement of the reasons for prohibiting the party, the section devoted to
national security does not even allege that the party was likely to engage
in or incite violence. Rather, the Secretary relied entirely on the party's
peaceful activities (mostly speech acts), which the Secretary characterised
as "concrete actions" aimed at achieving independence. In other words, the
Secretary has done exactly what the UN Human Rights Committee and
the European Court of Human Rights have ruled out - he has assumed
that the goal of Hong Kong independence is per se a threat to China's
national security. On this record, a judgment upholding the Secretary's
argument that it was "necessary" for national security to ban the HKNP
would set a very dangerous precedent.
Finally, it should be noted that under the heading of "national security"
the Secretary for Security has also relied upon speech acts by Chan that
the Secretary believes were designed to weaken China's international
standing.57 There is no doubt that Chan has criticised Beijing and that this
could diminish the reputation of the local and central governments. But a
threat to the international reputation of a particular government does not
constitute a threat to national security. The Human Rights Committee
emphasised this point in Mukong v Cameroon, in which the government
Ceylon v Turkey, ECHR (Grand Chamber) (1999).
6 Hong Kong Government, "Transcript of Remarks by Secretary for Security on Exercising Power
under Societies Ordinance" (24 September 2018), available at https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/
general/201809/24/P2018092400678.htm.
Enclosure 2 (n 10 above), especially paras 9, 14 and 15.
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of Cameroon prosecuted a journalist for "intoxication of international and
national opinion" after he criticised the government and Cameroon's one-
party system in the international press. 58 The government argued that this
advocacy weakened the state and its efforts to build national unity. The
Human Rights Committee firmly rejected Cameroon's position, concluding
that even if strengthening national unity were accepted as a legitimate aim
(it is not expressly stated as such in the ICCPR), the government could not
lawfully pursue that aim by attempting to muzzle advocacy for multiparty
democracy and human rights. Similarly, the Secretary for Security cannot
lawfully restrict advocacy for self-determination (a right stated in the
ICCPR) simply by asserting that Chan's public comments could "weaken"
national unity or China's international standing.
(b) Is the Order Necessary to Protect Public Safety
and Public Order?
If the HKNP had engaged in or incited violence (even small-scale local
violence that was not a direct threat to China's national security), then the
Secretary for Security could rely upon that as an independent justification
for prohibiting the party. A foundational principle in the Johannesburg
Principles is that a government can restrict rights if it demonstrates that
the expression is intended to incite imminent violence and is likely to do
so.9 In the section of his decision devoted to public order, the Secretary
has cited some colourful remarks made by Chan (apparently more than
two years ago) to argue that the HKNP has the potential to incite violence.
For example, Chan is alleged to have initially endorsed "whatever effective
means" to gain independence and to have urged Hong Kong people to
"pick up their weapons" to protect Hong Kong.6"
Of course, the timing of these remarks creates a problem for
the Secretary - if Chan really intended to incite violence with this
language and had the capacity to do so, then one would expect at
least one violent incident since he made those remarks in 2016. The
lack of actual violence in the past two and one-half years argues in
favour of Chan's explanation, which is that his more colourful remarks
have been taken out of context by the Secretary and constituted mere
political rhetoric, delivered at times when Chan was feeling particularly
emotional.61 Moreover, Chan maintains that the HKNP has publicly
" Communication No 458/91. Views adopted on 21 July 1994, [9.7].
'9 Johannesburg Principles (n 48 above), at Principle 6.
6 Enclosure 2 (n 10 above) para 18.
61 Written Submissions (n 15 above) paras 62-69.
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disavowed violence since at least mid-2016. The Secretary has been
careful to note Chan's submissions on this point but has entirely
discounted them, concluding, without evidence, that the commitment
to peaceful means was just a cynical tactic to help Chan run for office,
register his company, and, avoid an order of prohibition.62
To a large extent, this issue would depend not on the law but on
a court's assessment of the evidence. If a court were to accept the
Secretary's factual conclusions, then it could perhaps uphold the order
on the narrow ground that Chan's early advocacy was intended to incite
violence and had the capacity to do so, that his more recent commitment
to nonviolence was not believable, and that it was therefore necessary
to prohibit the HKNP in order to protect public safety and public order.
If such a judgment were expressly tied to Chan's apparent endorsement
of violent means then this would not set a dangerous precedent.63 Other
political parties that advocate for self-determination or independence
would just have to be very careful to expressly disavow all forms of
violence and avoid any language that might be construed as advocating
for the use of force.
What is more concerning is the Secretary's second argument under
the heading of "public order", which is that the HKNP has not ruled
out organising peaceful assemblies that might be large enough to block
traffic. 64 Given its tiny size, it is highly unlikely that the HKNP could
inspire a massive protest along the lines of Occupy Central in 2014. More
importantly, however, the capacity of a political party to organise a large-
scale peaceful assembly should never be used as a justification for declaring
that party to be an "illegal society". In his explanation for relying upon this
rationale, the Secretary for Security speculated that because of the HKNP's
previous language there is a risk that supporters with violent tendencies
may turn out to join even a peaceful protest. This is, of course, a possibility
for any organisation engaged in social movements. But it would be an
exceedingly damaging precedent if the court were to uphold the order on
this basis. If genuine, the Secretary's concern would be more appropriately
dealt with under the Public Order Ordinance, which gives the Hong Kong
government significant discretion over the location and timing of public
62 Enclosure 2 (n 10 above) para 21.
6 The government would, however, be open to criticism for its selective enforcement of this
strict "non-violence" standard because it has not taken equivalent action against pro-China
politicians who have advocated violence against pro-independence advocates. See Earnest Kao,
'Unhealthy and Stupid' Calls to Kill Advocates of Hong Kong Independence Criticised by
City's Leader" South China Morning Post (19 September 2017).
6 Enclosure 2 (n 10 above) para 23.
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demonstrations.65 To ban a political party on this highly speculative basis
would constitute a disproportionate and draconian measure, in violation of
the ICCPR and the Basic Law.
(c) Arguments Based on "Hate Speech" and the Need to Protect
the Rights of Others
Finally, the Secretary for Security has argued - perhaps as a backup
position - that the HKNP "spreads hatred and discrimination" against
Mainland Chinese and that this provides an independent justification
for prohibiting the party.66 The ICCPR does permit restrictions on the
freedoms of expression and association where necessary to protect the rights
of others.67 Indeed, art 20 of the ICCPR obligates governments to prohibit
propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.68
Article 20 does not, however, create a general exception to the
government's obligations under arts 19 and 22 of the ICCPR. Rather, a
government should only use art 20 as a justification for prohibiting speech of
"an extreme nature" and it must always abide by the duty of proportionality.6 9
Prohibiting an entire political party on this ground is a draconian measure
which requires an especially strong showing of necessity. In countries that
adhere to the ICCPR, an organisation would not normally be banned on
this basis unless its very purpose was to promote ethnic or racial hatred and
it had the capacity to do so.70 A good example of an organisation that met
that standard is the National and Patriotic Association of Polish Victims
of Bolshevism and Zionism: the association's memorandum of association
demonstrated a clear intent to revive anti-Semitism, as did the "anti-
Semitic tenor" of the party's submissions in court.71 These facts and the
tragic consequences of anti-Semitism in Poland enabled the European
Court of Human Rights to uphold the Polish government's decision to
6 The government has been widely criticised for using that discretion to make it more difficult
for pro-democracy groups to organise marches. See Christy Leung, "Hong Kong's July 1 March
Participants Could Face Legal Action over Start Point in Shopping Areas, Police Chief Stephen
Lo Warns" South China Morning Post (15 April 2018).
6 See ICCPR art 20, which obligates governments to prohibit advocacy for "national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hatred, or violence."
"' ICCPR arts 19(3) and 22(2).
61 Ibid., art 20.
69 General Comment 34 (n 41 above) para 53.
" See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Guidelines
on Prohibition and Dissolution of Political Parties and Analogous Measures (10 January 2000),
available at https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-INF
(2000)001-e.
71 WP v Poland, ECHR, App no 42264/98, 2 September 2004.
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prohibit the association. In contrast, in Jersild v Denmark, the European
Court of Human Rights held that it was disproportionate to prosecute
a journalist who produced a documentary, even though it included very
explicit expressions of hatred by a group of racist youths. The Court noted
that the journalist's purpose was not to promote racial hatred but rather to
stimulate public debate on racism and other social problems in Denmark.72
Similarly, the stated purpose of the HKNP was obviously not to
promote discrimination but rather to advocate for independence. The
Human Rights Committee has expressly stated that art 20 should
not be interpreted as a justification for prohibiting advocacy for self-
determination.73 The fact that Chan believes that increased immigration
from Mainland China to Hong Kong has caused certain social problems
- and that these problems would be reduced by independence - does
not magically transform the HKNP into a racist party. There also appears
to be no evidence that the HKNP incited discrimination against anyone.
In light of these facts, prohibiting the party is a grossly disproportionate
response, even if Chan made some comments that were considered
offensive to Mainland Chinese.
What is perhaps most disturbing about the Secretary for Security's
reasoning under this heading is his reliance on Chan's 2018 speech at the
FCC as an example of hate speech. The vast majority of this speech did
not even mention Mainland Chinese. Rather, Chan criticised the Chinese
Government - not only for its treatment of Hong Kong but also for its
violations of the rights of ethnic minorities in other parts of China. (In this
sense, Chan's speech would be more accurately characterised as condemning
discrimination rather than endorsing it.) There is only one paragraph in
the speech that focused on Mainland Chinese migrants themselves. That
paragraph argued that the level of migration is overwhelming local housing
and medical resources and may eventually cause Hong Kong to abandon
Cantonese and switch to Mandarin in the local educational system. Chan
thus referred to the Central Government's policies (including its efforts to
stifle local democracy) as a form of "national cleansing". " In his decision
to ban the HKNP, the Secretary for Security cited this paragraph as an
example of "incitement of hatred and discrimination against people of
72 Jersild v Denmark, App no 15890/89, (1995) 19 EHRR 1, 23 September 1994.
UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 11 art 20 (Prohibition of propaganda for war
and inciting national, racial, or religious hatred), 29 July 1983, HRI /GEN/1/Rev 9 (Vol I, p 182).
For the video and text of the speech, see "Video: In full - Activist Andy Chan Says Hong
Kong Independence Is the only Path to Democracy at Press Club Talk" Hong Kong Free Press
(14 August 2018), available at https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/08/14/video-full-activist-
andy-chan-says-hong-kong-independence-path-democracy-press-club-talk!.
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Mainland origin on the ground of where they were from".75 This is an
absurd characterisation of Chan's speech, which contains no suggestion
that Mainland Chinese are inferior or evil or that local residents should
discriminate against them.
Finally, the Human Rights Committee has reminded governments that
any restrictions designed to protect people from expressions of racial hatred
must be in "strict conformity" with art 19 and the duty of proportionality. 76
This means that even if the government genuinely believes that Mainland
Chinese might experience discrimination as a result of the HKNP's
rhetoric then it has a duty to explore less draconian ways of protecting
Mainland Chinese than banning the HKNP. In this case, there is an
obvious alterative, which is to add language to the Race Discrimination
Ordinance (Cap 602) to make it clear that the term "national origin"
includes origin from anywhere outside Hong Kong.77 This would give
Mainland Chinese the right to go to the Equal Opportunities Commission
and request a legal remedy if they experience discrimination, harassment
or vilification because of their origin. Yet, when commentators have made
this suggestion the government has always rejected it as unnecessary.
Under these circumstances, it is disingenuous for the Secretary to rely upon
a sudden desire to protect Mainland Chinese from discrimination as the
justification for the very extreme measure of prohibiting a political party.
5. Conclusion
Most residents of Hong Kong will not miss the HKNP if the ban is allowed
to stand. It was never a popular group and was considered, even by most
pro-democracy groups, to be on the fringe of Hong Kong politics. The
government may have hoped that Chan would not even challenge the
order in court due to his limited financial resources and the lack of public
legal funding. If this happens then the order will have a chilling effect on
many people even though it will not have been tested in court.
If the order is challenged in court then the judiciary will be placed in
an exceedingly difficult position. In some respects, the situation will be
similar to that faced by the courts in Ng Kung Siu because the Central
Government will have such a strong interest in the outcome. However, as
a content-based restriction on the freedoms of association and expression,
the ban on the HKNP would be far more difficult to reconcile with the
Enclosure 2 (n 10 above) para 27.
76 General Comment 34 (n 41 above) para 53.
7 Carole J Petersen, "Racial Equality and the Law: Creating an Effective Statute and Enforcement
Model for Hong Kong" (2004) 34 HKLJ 459, 465-467.
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ICCPR than an ordinance prohibiting flag desecration. If the order
declaring the HKNP to be an illegal society is upheld then it is essential
that the judgment be tied closely to the specific facts of this case and to the
evidence (however thin) that Chan originally suggested the use of force
to achieve independence. The court must avoid issuing any judgment that
defines advocacy for independence as a per se threat to either national
security or public order or that defines criticism of migration policies as
a form of hate speech. The court would also need to craft its judgment
in a way that makes it clear that Hong Kong residents have the right to
advocate peacefully for democracy and human rights, including the right
to self-determination.8
ICCPR art 1. It should be noted that self-determination does not necessarily amount to
independence. In international law, the term "internal self-determination" is used to refer to
the right to democracy and political participation or to the right to exercise cultural, linguistic,
religious, territorial or political autonomy within the boundaries of the existing state. See Michael
C van Walt and 0 Seroo (eds), The Implementation of the Right to Self-Determination as a
Contribution to Conflict Prevention, Report of the International Conference of Experts held in
Barcelona from 21 to 27 November 1998, UNESCO Division of Human Rights Democracy and
Peace and the UNESCO Centre of Catalonia, p 12 (discussing different meanings of "internal
self-determination" and controversies surrounding the term), available at http://www.unpo.org/
downloads/THE%20IMPLEMENTATION%200F%20THE%20RIGHT%20TO%20SELEpdf.
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